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Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization
with Counter Narratives: Testing the Breaking the ISIS Brand
Counter Narrative Videos in American Somali Focus Group
Settings
Abstract
Research focused on measuring attitudes towards violent extremist groups and the appeal
of violent extremist ideologies among the vulnerable communities in the United States
remains under-researched. This focus group research attempts to close such a research
gap. In May of 2018, International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
researchers focus tested ICSVE-produced counter-narratives with Somali-American youth
in San Diego, CA, namely with Somali-American youth convened at the East African
Cultural Community Center and the premises of San Diego State University. In addition to
raising awareness about the dangers of joining violent extremist groups like Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and lending promising evidence that speaks to the quality and
authenticity of our counter-narratives, this article presents a methodological argument, or
a case study, in the use of counter narratives as an effective Counter Violent Extremism
(CVE) tool. The use of counter narratives also served to start important conversations and
engage with the Somali American community in a way that could open a path towards
testing our counter-narrative content among those whom we might be able to detect a
more substantial persuasive effect.
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Introduction
As many as 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 110 countries joined
ISIS and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria.1 In the United States
alone, over 200 individuals were either recruited or groomed into joining
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.2 The George Washington University’s (GWU)
Program on Extremism researchers listed Ohio, Virginia, and Minnesota
as the states with highest volunteer rate into conflict zones in Iraq and
Syria.3 These are states with a high representation, vis a vis other states, of
Somali immigrants. ISIS and other violent extremist groups have been
particularly successful in targeting Somali-American communities, which
are primarily concentrated in Columbus, Ohio; San Diego, California; and
St Paul, Minnesota, with a considerable presence in the Commonwealth of
Virginia as well.4
As of 2016, at least 20 young Minnesotans, primarily ethnic Somalis, have
left to join violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, with at least five
believed to have been killed there.5 At least nine Minnesotans have been
arrested since 2014 for attempting to join terrorist groups in Iraq and
Syria.6 Other examples include twenty-nine-year-old Abdifatah Dayib
Ahmed, also known as Abdirahman Muhumed, who left Minnesota in
2014 to join ISIS in Syria. He was reportedly killed in Syria.7 Likewise,
Somali American Mohamed Osman Mahmoud was sentenced to 30 years
in prison in 2014 for his alleged role in planning to detonate a bomb at a
tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon.8
As the evidence suggests, Somali Americans in particular remain
vulnerable for recruitment into ISIS and other violent extremist groups.
Communities at risk, such as Somali, and those serving them, need the
necessary training and tools to counter the narratives and calls to action of
violent extremist groups like ISIS. Such groups are currently active on
social media, and even pinpoint these communities.9
While ISIS is likely to lose its remaining strongholds in Syria, as it has in
much of Iraq, its powerful ideology, operations, and tactics are likely to
remain active. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the terrorist
group has not disappeared despite its territorial loses and heavy
decapitation of the leadership.10 The group has morphed into an
underground insurgency and movement heavily networked through the
now global dispersion of its fighter supporters.11 It remains capable of
maintaining and further strengthening its remaining networks; deploying
battle-hardened terrorists to wage terrorist acts in the country of origin or
elsewhere; and to lure in, inspire, and encourage those who never
managed to travel to Syria or Iraq to attack at home.
In addition to defeating them militarily on the ground, central to our CVE
efforts remains the task of preventing attacks at home by raising
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awareness about the dangers emanating from violent extremist groups and
building resilience to recruitment in our communities. Civil society
organizations have a major role to play in this respect, especially when
knowing that many vulnerable Muslim communities in the United States
remain skeptical of government involvement in CVE-related matters—and
at times of CVE initiatives at all—often suspecting anyone involved in CVE
matters as working as government informants.12
This article reports on the ICSVE’s efforts to offer access to such resources
to Somali community members in San Diego, CA. ICSVE organized
community sponsored activist meetings held in small groups with Somali
American youth at the East African Cultural Community Center and the
premises of San Diego State University.13The goal was to engage them in
discussions about the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative
videos, which feature ISIS defectors, returnees, and prisoners speaking out
against the group. The authors used two methods to conduct their study:
Focus groups for data collection and content analysis for data analysis.

Somali-American Radicalization and Violent Extremism
Context
While all communities remain susceptible and vulnerable to the appeal of
terrorist organizations like ISIS and al Shabaab, the appeal and
susceptibility of the Somali-American community to such groups remains
especially puzzling for many CVE and government professionals. Several
factors, namely a complex set of grievances, whether real or perceived,
rooted in negative perceptions towards Muslims in general and black
males in particular are key contributors. Other factors include a profound
identity crisis among the American-Somali youth rooted in being new
immigrants and often entering an unsupportive, if not hostile,
environment along with challenged family structures with the loss of
father figures for many new immigrants who fled from war-torn Somalia.
Socially, a milieu remains highly concerned over ongoing civil conflict in
Somalia, and social and educational systems often fail to provide adequate
safety nets. Local imams also fail at times to understand, reach, and
educate Somali American youth about positive and peaceful
interpretations of Islam that might explain the struggle of the SomaliAmerican community to effectively counter the appeal of violent
extremists and terrorist groups. All of these factors have presented an
opportunity for extremist groups to manipulate these communities and
encourage vulnerable youth living in America to join terrorist groups such
as al-Shabaab and ISIS.14
Research has highlighted identity-related challenges within the SomaliAmerican community, as many of them belong to the pool of firstgeneration immigrants and have in many cases failed to integrate into
mainstream society. Vulnerabilities also become apparent as many
33
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Somalis occupy shares of single-family households that have been
traumatically bereaved and lacking a father figure.15 In combination, all
these factors appear to increase the lure of groups like ISIS and al
Shabaab, who seem to offer them a fictive kinship, masculine role models,
and escape from boredom and frustration. They also offer adventures,
alongside new positive identities and feelings of personal significance to
address global conflicts and seek meaning and purpose in life.
The combined issues of individual and collective history of psychological
traumatization, community tensions upon landing in the United States,
customary immigrant-related challenges, and family bereavements and
broken families all play a part. These could also be categorized as issues of
identity, challenged family structures, educational and social mobility
challenges, grievances over discrimination (perceived and real), and so
forth. All these conditions make them vulnerable to violent extremist
groups like ISIS.
Some authors find poverty and lack of social mobility as questionable
motivations for departing to the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria.16 Indeed,
poverty and lack of social mobility alone are unlikely to be sufficient
causes for joining, but these factors become important when combined
with exposure to a terrorist group and its ideology. Terrorist groups tend
to take advantage of these factors, but without exposure to the group, we
are highly unlikely to a see a terrorist emerge or form. Others also stress
the lack of adequate “language and cultural training prior to migration
[primarily following the ousting of general Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991]
as a reason leading to the greater insularity of Somali community
compared to other, more integrated Muslim immigrant communities,”
which may also be another factor challenging these particular
immigrants.17
At the ICSVE, we generally view the making of a terrorist as a function of
multiple levels of actors and forces. To make a terrorist, there must be a
group purporting to represent some segment of a society and presenting
violence as an answer to contentious socio-political issues facing that
particular segment of the society. The group also provides an ideology to
justify terrorist violence and garner social support for both the group and
its ideology. Three variables—the group, ideology, and social support—
then interact with the vulnerabilities and motivations existing at the level
of the individual.18
In the case of Somali-American recruitment, the legacy of the conflict in
Somalia and the active presence of terrorist groups there have created
enduring opportunities and links for Somali-American immigrants to join
“jihad” back in Somalia. This was first evidenced through a first wave of
young Somalis departing Minneapolis and other areas to support alShabaab and other groups in Somalia between 2006 and 2011. This wave
34
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 4

speaks to the success of groups like al-Shabaab, and later ISIS, at
recruiting among the members of Somali-American community.19 In
Minnesota, a European al Shabaab fighter became the first to recruit
among vulnerable Somali youth. He stressed the urgency to join the
conflict in defense of what he claimed would be the massive rape of their
Somali “sisters” by foreign Kenyan soldiers.20 This narrative naturally
appealed to the challenged manhood of young immigrant Somali men who
were finding they were failing to integrate into Somali American
community or who at times even felt rejected by the African-American
community.21
The first wave of Somali Americans became their own force of recruitment,
namely using Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms to
induce, incite, and shame their fellow Somali Americans into joining. This
led to the creation of the second wave of Minnesotan Somali American
recruits. Although in many cases socially better integrated—even included
an aspiring medical student among them—they responded to the appeal of
their “brothers” who used social media to glorify the Somali “jihad” while
often shaming their counterparts for “hanging out at the Mall of
America.”22
Later waves of Somali-American immigrants joining and attempting to
join terrorist groups abroad followed the onset of the Syrian conflicts and
the partial merging of ISIS and al Shabaab.23 During this time, Somalis
were recruited not only into al Shabaab but also into ISIS in Iraq and
Syria. While on-the-ground recruitment and grooming for recruitment
during all three waves of recruitment of Somali Americans appears to have
been minimal, with nearly all coming via the Internet, some suggest that
recruiters sending young Somalis to the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria
were the same recruiters who sent many young Somalis to join Al Shabaab
and other groups in Somalia.24
Whereas on-the-ground ISIS recruiters and networks facilitating travel to
Syria and Iraq were quite active in Europe and the Balkans, in the United,
for instance, the most recruiting has occurred via the Internet. Sometimes,
the process involved one or more individuals serving as a recruitment
node using downloads and online connections to facilitate further face-toface recruiting with others on- the- ground inside the United States.
Although social media and online recruitment is known to play an
important role in moving individuals inside the United States along the
violent extremism and terrorism trajectory, with respect to the members
of Somali community in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, some suggest that
face-to-face interactions represented the key component of recruitment
into terrorist organizations like ISIS. In other words, social media and
online recruitment in the context of Somali community recruitment in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area primarily served to spread extremist messages
already propagated by extremist recruiters on the ground.25 While
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evidence exists to suggest that some youth who downloaded extremist
propaganda served as recruitment hubs for inciting others, evidence of
actual recruiters traveling in from outside the United States to target these
communities when it came to ISIS remains largely absent.
Whereas al-Shabaab recruiters appealed to an “Islamic-nationalist
identity” to lure its potential recruits—also as a means to overcome clan
divisions within the country—though recently it has also resorted to the
call for “Islamist nationalism” to mobilize, ISIS recruitment widened to
those of other victims of war-torn areas and to the idea of global jihad and
the so-called Caliphate it created. 26 Some argued that while ISIS’ appeal
served to antagonize local jihadi groups (for example, in Somalia) and
other powerful non-Muslim states in the region, the group deemed such a
strategy as necessary to both attract recruits in the so-called Caliphate and
reclaim the status of the “champion of the global jihadist ideal.”27 In
addressing this change in recruitment appeals between al Shabaab and
ISIS, as well as the phenomenon of young Twin City Somali travelers the
conflict zone in Syria, some researchers note:
Al Shabaab’s recruiting message had been based on nationalism
and genealogy, as well as religion, and multiple sources said they
could understand the enduring desire to see their mother country
stabilize and improve, even as they disagreed with the extremist
interpretation of Islam that al Shabaab espouses. In Syria, however,
that nationalistic zeal does not apply, meaning recruiters are
attracting young people not based on their country of origin but by
appealing to the notion of a global Muslim community and ISIL’s
vision of a caliphate and apocalypse.28
Policy recommendations stemming from studies focused on the SomaliAmerican community included helping immigrants to integrate by
extending more resources to the community and helping them to
overcome obstacles to integrating successfully. The recommendations
highlighted that the “self-imposed” segregation and a desire to adhere to
cultural heritage in the Somali American community may also serve as a
leeway for radical extremist elements to radicalize young Somalis even
more, and that some changes may need to occur from inside the
community as well. They also included winning “the hearts and minds” of
the community so as not to alienate crucial partners in the fight against
violent extremism.29 Indeed, in some Somali American communities, the
words CVE and counter-terrorism seem to have taken on a negative
connotation and are being associated with informants and negative
profiling.30
Other studies on the Somali-American community identified both
challenges related to extremism and measures aimed at reducing
susceptibility to radicalization and recruitment. One such measure
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included a focus on “multi-level community” interventions. The value of
approaching the issue of extremism from this perspective is that it extends
beyond family-level interventions and takes a systemic view of the
problems. Such projects have also been defined as long-term, social,
economic, and educational in nature. For instance, multi-level
intervention programs are called for to engage local imams and other
important community leaders in the ideological debate and provide them
with necessary tools and training to prevent the recruitment of Somali
youth. These reputable imams and religious workers, or other Somali male
mentors, would also be enlisted to work with youth and encourage their
development in the areas of education, careers, and personal development.
Others recommended generating programs that encourage civil
engagement and public service among the young. An equally important
aspect of the multi-level intervention approach is to counter extremist
narratives and propaganda online by introducing alternative viewpoints
targeted through public messaging and information campaigns.31
Community-level collaborative partnerships are highlighted in the
literature as being important in developing, testing, and monitoring
intervention prevention strategies through partnerships with local
associates, businesses, and mosques—to just name a few. The emphasis is
placed on interdisciplinary collaborations involving law enforcement,
education, social and mental health services, and academia. The primary
goal of such interventions is to identify relevant psychosocial and societal
processes from within the Somali-American community that could
potentially strengthen counter radicalization and counterterrorism efforts.
The specific program initiatives include leveraging psychosocial processes,
namely understand the inter-relatedness between different social factors
and an individual’s thought, behavior, learning process, and other
psychological factors, to support the activities of law enforcement in the
realm of counterterrorism; generate collaborative radicalization
prevention programs involving government, civil society, and other CVE
practitioners and actors; generate research to better understand
counterterrorism and/or psychosocial issues in these communities; and
provide necessary culturally-based and culturally-informed education,
training, and technical assistance to law enforcement and psychosocial
workers fighting terrorism.32In an effort to increase diversity within the
force, some law enforcement units in the country have also begun to hire
qualified candidates from within the Somali American community and
allocate resources to community engagement efforts.33
One such approach also involves strengthening community and family
protective services. This can be done by encouraging and strengthening
parental involvement in the areas such as education and mentoring. This
is especially important given the history of violent conflicts many Somali
families had to endure back in Somalia and the likelihood that many might
carry scars of psychological trauma. This particular approach also involves
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government outreach activities and involvement of faith-based
communities and organizations. Other efforts are focused on building
family interventions through research and understanding of social
circumstances from the perspective of refugees and the immigrant
segment of Somali-American youth, including from single mother
households. For instance, research into single mother Somali-American
households may help to understand the challenges of mother-led families
who are trying to cope with their youth. This could also help to understand
how being from mother-led family households affects identify formation
and how it may leave some vulnerable to looking for positive masculine
relationships and models.34

Literature Review on Narratives and Counter-Narratives
Corman defined narratives as a “system of stories that share themes,
forms, and architypes.”35 Whereas stories represent a “sequence of events
involving actors and actions,” narratives do not require full stories, as they
can simply be communicated through use of words, graphics, or
phrases.36The most effective narratives are the ones characterized by
legitimacy, compelling purpose, consistency, quantifiable results, and
relevancy in the eyes of potential supporters and sympathizers.37
In designing narratives, extremist groups make use of historical events,
religious terminology, political events, and appeal to higher authorities,
among others, to generate an intended audience.38 Their narratives are
strategically designed and customized to the needs and vulnerabilities of
their target audience. They are also launched to motivate to engage and
execute certain actions, including violent actions.39 There is significant
consensus regarding the impact of narratives on “beliefs, attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors,” both for the purposes of radicalization and to
fight radicalization.40 Strictly speaking, in the context of violent extremism
and terrorism, researchers have identified four criteria that are important
in constructing counter-narratives:
1) “Revealing incongruities and contradictions in the terrorist
narratives and how terrorists act,
2) Disrupting analogies between the target narrative and real-world
events,
3) Disrupting binary themes of the group’s ideology, and
4) Advocating an alternative view of the terrorist narrative’s target.”41
Counter-narratives are especially powerful when 1) rooted in sound
research and understanding of the extremist narrative, 2) rooted in the
sound understanding of elements of radicalization and behavioral change,
3) aimed at specific [target] audience, 4) perceived by receiving audience
as credible, and 5) format and message distribution is highly controlled.42
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There are three types of messaging, narrative frameworks, or narrative
approaches that can be effectively used to counter violent extremism:
Alternative narratives, counter-narratives, and government strategic
communications. 43 Counter-narratives serve to target and discredit
terrorist groups and their ideologies by deconstructing and demystifying
their messages to demonstrate their lies, hypocrisy, and inconsistencies.
Briggs and Feve described counter-narratives as a strategy that “challenges
extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly,
through a range of online and offline means.”44 Provided they are logically
structured and conceivable in the eyes of the target audience, they can be
powerful in challenging and amplifying contradictions in extremist
narrative.45 While counter-narratives are reactive in nature, meaning they
are created in response to certain extremist narratives, alternative
narratives complement counter-narratives by emphasizing democratic
values, positive social change, and “undercutting violent extremist
narratives by focusing on what we are ‘for’ rather than ‘against.’” 46
Lastly, government strategic communications refer to government efforts
aimed at clarifying government policies, stance, or actions towards an
issue. It also includes public awareness activities. Both government
strategic communications and alternative narratives can be useful for
prevention but are unlikely to reach those already being seduced by
terrorist ideologies and groups and thereby narrowing their focus to
messaging only from terrorists. In addition, both counter-narratives and
alternative narratives can reinforce each-other’s effectiveness if used
simultaneously.47
Both counter-narratives and alternative narratives are rooted in
theoretical assumptions that they can be used to prevent and counter
radicalization and violent extremism. Some authors question the utility of
counter-narratives as a constructive method of preventing and countering
violent extremism, as they are primarily focused on targeting ideology and
that they fail to differentiate between violent behaviors and radical beliefs
and ideology.48 More specifically, some authors argued that there is a
fallacy in assuming that ideas are root causes of violent behavior and that
“violent acts can be prevented by removing or falsifying ideas.”49 Glazzard
summarized such assumptions as “violent ideas lead to violent deeds, that
counter-narratives can replace terrorist narratives, and that the actual
threat of violent extremism can be mitigated through discourse.”50
Others contended that counter-narratives can be especially problematic in
that they can strengthen extremists’ conviction and further reinforce the
narrative [for example, ideological] they are attempting to counter: “
When counter-narrative talks up the ideology and demonizes it, the
ideology is also glamorized and made more attractive, and it is
empowered.51 Indeed, one should not discount potential impact when
ideologically attenuated individuals view counter-narratives (cognitive
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dissonance) as well as the potential impact on those who are unsure of
what to believe and are searching for ISIS propaganda material.
While these risks exist, one could also argue that not all counter-narratives
target ideology alone. They also highlight real-life stories of insiders to
highlight the human costs of engaging in violent extremism and terrorism
for both for the recruit and those harmed by the group. Moreover, the
primary objective of counter-narratives is to discredit violent extremist
groups in the eyes of potential recruits to and save them from the costs
associated with engaging in violent extremism.52
A number of counter-narrative campaigns have been constructed and
launched over the years. Quilliam, a UK-based CVE organization, in
partnership with Verbalisation, launched#NotAnotherBrother to fight the
appeal of violent extremism. As part of the campaign, a short counternarrative video was released on YouTube to counter the social media
recruitment of terrorist groups like ISIS.53 Following the November 2015
Paris attacks, Quilliam launched # NousSommesUnis video to raise
awareness about the dangers of violent extremism and emphasize unity
between the West and Muslims.54
Jigsaw, a Google in-house think tank, piloted the “Redirect Method” to
target individuals most susceptible to ISIS recruitment and redirect them
to YouTube and other counter-narratives and alternative narratives that
subtly undermine ISIS. While the initiative targeted ISIS recruiting
themes, it did not specifically target ISIS.55To prevent UK’s young Muslims
from leaving to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, a group of former
extremists created a popular online cartoon called “Abdullah X.” The
character of Abdullah represents a young disillusioned Muslim who is
initially attracted to the kind of ideology terrorist and extremist groups
like ISIS espouse but who, in the end, decides not to follow the extremist
path.56
In December of 2017, ICSVE researchers launched a Facebook ad
campaign using one of their counter-narratives. The ad targeted Iraq,
where Facebook is currently the most widely used social media platform.
The campaign led close to 1.7 million views and hundreds of specific
comments related to both the counter-narrative and ISIS in general.57
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism researchers also
launched Facebook campaigns that targeted in English and Albanian
language Facebook users who evidenced support for ISIS and found that
they could reach this audience and engage them with the counter narrative
videos.58 International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism staff also
routinely places their counter-narrative videos on YouTube and monitors
the many comments. Particularly those comments in Arabic language
suggest that they are reaching a target audience that engages with the
videos, oftentimes in a highly heated manner.
40
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Although well intentioned, some counter-narrative and alternative
narrative campaigns launched over the years have been heavily criticized
by CVE and counter-terrorism professionals. For example, the U.S. State
Department’s “Think Again, Turn Away” campaign against ISIS was
criticized because it heavily relied on recycling ISIS’ violent footage in
ways that some believed may have served to “legitimize terrorists.”59
Similarly, during the last fifteen years, the UK Home office commissioned
websites and groups to argue against the use of “martyrdom” and terrorist
group’s call to militant jihad. Largely relying on cognitive arguments and
using Islamic scriptures, these attempts were directed at presenting
moderate views of Islam. However, they fell flat when it came to
addressing the grievances that terrorists were so adept at using. More
importantly, they fell flat in the face of al-Qaeda’s, and now ISIS’, use of
emotionally evocative pictures, videos, and graphic images arguing that
Islam, Muslims, and Muslim lands are under attack by the West, including
that jihad is an obligatory duty of all Muslims and that “martyrdom”
missions are called for in Islam.60
ISIS’ creative and emotionally evocative use of video alongside of their
advantage of social media feedback mechanisms made counter-narratives
that are based on cognitive argument alone, versus emotionally evocative
counter stories, pale in comparison to what ISIS puts out. In this regard,
voices of disillusioned ISIS cadres, when coupled with emotionally
evocative imagery, may serve more effectively as tools to discredit ISIS and
their militant jihadi ideology.61

Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization
with Counter Narratives
Focus group settings are rarely seen in the terrorism/CVE literature as a
source of data. This is unfortunate, as the intimate settings afforded by
focus groups allow for the collection of outstanding qualitative data that
can serve as the foundation for theorizing and exploring further about
issues in question, such as in this case of resonance of vulnerable
populations to ISIS and its recruitment tactics, as well as ways to bolster
resilience to the same.62
In light of the literature findings and previous success, focus testing of the
ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand counter narrative videos in multiple
venues worldwide, ICSVE staff proposed to introduce focus groups
discussions to Somali American youth led by a local Somali role model
utilizing ISIS-related counter narrative videos. The purpose of the focus
group testing was to:
1. Start conversations and engage with the Somali American
community about violent extremism in a manner that might engage
41
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2.

3.
4.

5.

an audience already considered vulnerable and alienated vis-à-vis
CVE efforts.
Open a path towards testing our counter-narrative content by
engaging in conversations centered on the counter narratives to
learn if and how they might have a substantial dissuading affect, as
intended.
Discuss relevant topics they are likely to encounter from groups like
ISIS as it pertains to ISIS extremist material and propaganda
online.
Utilize the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative
Videos to argue against the claims and promises that ISIS makes to
youth. While the flow of “foreign fighters” to Iraq and Syria has
decreased significantly in light of the group’s recent territorial
losses in Iraq and much of Syria, violent extremist groups like ISIS
continue to recruit and entice vulnerable youth into violence—
perhaps even accelerating their work in this regard of late.
Reducing the ability of online propaganda and recruiters to entice
and dupe youth is a key to further reducing ISIS or similar violent
extremist group’s power.
Offer educational training and tools to vulnerable communities to
fight seductive messages that ISIS and similar violent extremist
groups continue to propagate.

Ethics of Counter-Narrative Production
As researchers, we strive to develop a sound understanding of the problem
we are trying to address. In other words, we aim to identify the type of
message or communication campaign that is most likely to resonate with
our target audience. In this regard, field research becomes a starting point
to get to the desired objectives. Through our primary, field research into
violent extremist groups like ISIS, we have developed an in-depth
understanding of the narratives that we aim to counter and the many
ways in which joiners to ISIS first learned of the group and were enticed
into it—often via the Internet. In creating our counter-narratives, we
carefully consider the elements of a narrative that could be most appealing
to our target audience. We also consider why members of our target
audience could be attracted to such narratives.63
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism researchers have
to date interviewed ninety-four ISIS and sixteen al-Shabaab related violent
extremists, including their family members. Their stories take central
stage in our counter-narratives. Before interviews, we make sure that we
gain informed consent from our participants. International Center for the
Study of Violent Extremism researcher give a special care and attention to
those in prison to make sure they are speaking freely and know that they
may be under surveillance that neither they nor we can control. We avoid
posing any questions that could lead to the disclosure and admission of
42
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potential crimes or participation in illegal activities. Before the counternarratives are produced and distributed, the participants decide whether
they want their faces blurred and names withheld (use pseudonyms).

Methodology
In May of 2018, ICSVE researchers conducted two focus groups in San
Diego, CA. The authors relied on focus groups for data collection and
content analysis for data analysis. Focus groups took place at the East
African Cultural Community Center and the premises of San Diego
University. The focus groups were conducted as part of ICSVE’s efforts to
measure and evaluate the effectiveness of its counter-narrative videos,
namely “A Sex Slave for You—A gift from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” and
“Rewards for Joining the Islamic State,” in generating useful discussions
about topics relevant to ISIS recruiting among the members of the Somali
American community. The focus group discussion and testing were
designed to gather information from the participants about the
counternarrative videos and about the following outcomes:
1. To understand participants views about the so-called Islamic State
2. Assess qualitative and content-based aspects of our counternarratives (for example, authenticity of the character/actor featured
in the counter-narrative)
3. To open discussions about topics that ISIS is raising in its Internet
recruiting, with an alternative focus that denounces the terrorist
group and its false claims
4. To raise awareness about the dangers of joining terrorist
organizations like ISIS.
5. To understand the role of counter-narratives in helping to create
resilience against violent extremist groups and ideologies in their
respective communities.
6. To offer participants necessary educational tools to thwart the
appeal of violent extremist and terrorist groups in their respective
communities.
Compared to our other attempts aimed at directly reaching the same
audience that ISIS targets, this particular focus group was conducted with
a convenience sample of Somali-Americans in San Diego, California.64
In part, the authors chose San Diego for its large Somali American
community and its history associated with violent extremism and
terrorism. For instance, one of the 9/11 terrorist cells were based in San
Diego. The internationally known terrorist ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki,
who was killed in a drone strike in 2011, was a San Diego cleric who
actively engaged America youth, although it is not clear what his effect was
during those years.65 In 2014, Douglas McArthur McCain, a former City
College student, left San Diego to become an ISIS fighter, eventually
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ending up killed in Syria. His brother was indicted for making false claims
to law enforcement.66 The office of the Southern District of California U.S.
Attorney’s office prosecuted four Somali immigrants for providing
material support to Al Shabaab.67
We also considered the availability of a suitable and credible (within the
Somali-American community) Somali American role model to run the
discussions. Lastly, many young Somalis in the San Diego area remain
vulnerable to the social media recruiting tactics used by terrorist groups
like ISIS.
The ICSVE researchers facilitated two separate focus groups. Participants
in Focus Group 1 were shown “Rewards for Joining the Islamic State,”
whereas Focus Group 2 participants “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Each group contained 5-7 participants.68 Participants
were selected randomly and by relying on a snowball sampling technique
(for example, by relying on friend/colleague referrals; at the gym, coffee
shops, etc.). The average age of the participants in both focus groups was
26. All participants were Sunni and male. See Table 1 below for the
demographic breakdown.
Table 1. Demographic Data of Focus Group Participants
Age

Education

Economic Status

FG1- Participant 1
Lower/poor
FG1- Participant 2
Lower/poor
FG1-Participant 3
Lower/poor
FG1-Participant 4
Middle
FG1-Participant 5
Middle

21

Some University

23

Some University

30

Bachelor’s

28

MA or Ph.D.

30

Some University

FG2-Participant 1
Lower/poor
FG2-Particpant 2
Lower/poor
FG2-Participant 3
Lower/poor
FG2-Participant 4
Lower/poor
FG2-Participant 5
Lower/poor
Notes: Focus Group (FG); Source: Author

27

University

25

12th Grade

25

12th Grade

26

University

27

University
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We provided the participants with a description and overall objective of
the study. It clearly spelled out, risks, if any, involved in participation.
They were allowed to skip any question they did not feel confident or
comfortable discussing. We also informed them that they could leave the
room any time they wished to do so. We also provided them with a consent
form to sign, although verbal consents were approved in the case of those
who were hesitant about signing the form and thereby identifying
themselves. We informed them how their responses would be used. A copy
of the signed consent form was kept with a facilitator and a second copy
was handed to the participants. Once the video was shown to the
participants, a semi-structured paper and pencil survey also containing
some open-ended questions was filled out to capture participants’
anonymous responses and to ensure that everyone’s responses would be
recorded versus only the vocal participants. Next, participants were
engaged in an open, class-like discussion forum to further engage on the
topics presented. We did not use a pre-testing method, as prior attitudes
do not necessarily predict future behavior and there was concern that
asking about prior views about the group might be seen as collecting data
for law enforcement and intelligence gathering purposes.69 Future focus
group testing may include pre-testing to account for participant prior
knowledge or any possible bias associated with participant behavior,
although this is an extremely sensitive issue in these communities.

Validity, Appropriateness and Constraints of Focus Groups as
Data Collection Methods
As a qualitative research method, focus groups have and continue to be
used in social sciences, including in the realm of radicalization, violent
extremism, and terrorism.70 Table 2 below reflects advantages and
disadvantages of using focus groups as data collection methods. Such
observations are rooted in both literature review and author observation
during this particular research.71
Table 2. Advantages vs. Disadvantages of Using Focus Groups as
Data Collection Method
Advantages
•

•
•
•

Time and resource effective in
collection information, as
engaging more than one
participant at a time
All participants given the
opportunity to participate in
discussions
Participants given the opportunity
to build on each-other’s ideas
Group interaction leading to
better understanding on how
people explain and understand

Disadvantages
•
•
•

•

Potential Moderator induced bias
Participants apprehensive about
expressing their opinions publicly
Potentially exclude important
voices of those who are not
comfortable or do not accept to
speak publicly
Some participants may dominate
over other. Remedy: Participants
given equal share of participation.
Remain tactful with outspoken
members of the group and ensure
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certain issues, including how they
differ in such issues.
• Invaluable in measuring as to
what changes participants
support or like to see occur (for
example, by viewing our counter
narratives).
• Participants may be willing and
motivated to take action (for
example, discuss and share
counter narratives) because of
group interaction.
• Participants supporting eachother can help to think more
creatively
• Leading to rich data
Source: Author

•
•

that the voices of all participants
are heard.
Difficulties in distinguishing
between individual view and
group view
Difficulties in organizing and
ordering data for analysis

Data Analysis
The results section of the article contains survey results administered in
our two focus groups. To analyze the responses of our participants during
the focus group discussions, we relied on content analysis. Janis defined
content analysis as any technique:
(a) For the classification of the sign-vehicles
(b) Which relies solely upon the judgments (which theoretically may
range from perceptual discrimination to sheer guesses) of an
analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into
which categories
(c) Provided that the analyst’s judgments are regarded as the report
of a scientific observer.72
There are several distinct types of content analysis, namely:
•

•
•

“Sign-in vehicle analysis: Analyzing psychophysical properties of
the data. For example, to assess the extent to which a topic may be
emotionally appealing to our participants, we would have to
examine the number of emotion-laden words used by our
participants. Counting the number and types of words used is
essential under this type.”
“Pragmatic content analysis: The focus of the analysis is to
understand why something is said.”
“Semantical content analysis, which can be divided into three
categories:
o Designation analysis: Implies simple frequency counting
analysis. In other words, it denotes frequency with which
concepts, actors, institutions, etc. are mentioned.
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o Attribution analysis: It also denotes a simple frequency
counting exercise; however, the focus is on counting
adjectives, descriptive phrases, etc.
o Assertion analysis: A combination of designation and
attribution analysis. It denotes frequency with which certain
actors, concepts, institutions, etc., are characterized in a
particular way.”73
We started our analysis by using open coding, or the process of examining
our transcripts and notes to create important categories of information
based on the participants’ responses. We first engaged in the process of
“saturation” to “look for instances that represent a category” [or themes]
with relevant sub-categories or sub-theme. ”74 Such process led to the
creation of preliminary or initial coding frameworks, based on participant
response readings and analysis of our notes. Before the coding, we
assessed the reliability of our coding system by relying on inter-rater
reliability. It serves to measure the level of agreement between the coders
(researchers) and provides a quantitative index of the reliability of the
code recording system we have created (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of
.70).75 Given the nature of our focus groups, we opted to compute a
general rater reliability score, as our focus was on generating general
themes within our discussion groups as opposed to focus on specific units.
Once the initial open coding process was finalized—to the extent possible—
we then moved to collecting and organizing major themes (including
phrases, which later proved to be helpful when it came to utilizing the
NVivo software) into a single page. This was instrumental in locating and
crossing out all the duplications and drastically reducing the number of
relevant categories or themes. This particular list “governed” our analysis
and helped to divide the interviews into more manageable categories. In
the third stage, we went back to analyzing both “meaning units” and
“textural descriptions” to generate my sub-categories or sub-themes.76 In
other words, a number of sub-themes or sub-categories became evident
and we organized them along Janesick’s formatting lines:77
Example: The question related to the feelings about ISIS included
the major themes:
ISIS is evil: This major category or theme was represented in three
subcategories:
(a) Un-Islamic and not based in the Quran
(b) Killing innocent civilians, and
(c) Killing other Muslims
NVivo qualitative software was instrumental in finding themes and
analyzing the transcripts of the focus group answers. The software was
especially useful in employing the “auto-coding” feature, which was used
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to place all answers to a certain question under one particular node. For
instance, if we wanted to find out about our participants’ views on
particular aspect of the counter-narrative, we would click node,” Q1:
Reasons for liking or disliking the video.” Put differently, we grouped
participants’ views under the aforementioned category (all answers to a
single question grouped under one single category or page). This approach
represented the quickest and most efficient way to look for patterns and
more closely examine any pertinent themes, given they were all grouped
under the same category.
We used other important features of NVivo’s “auto-coding,” such as “word
frequency,” to look for most commonly utilized words by our participants
(for example, “Un-Islamic, evil, etc.). Moreover, through this particular
feature, we were able to further adjust our query from “Search for Exact
words” to “Search for synonymous words.” This gave us a wide array of
word options and tools to better organize and find new emerging themes
(See sample output to one of the questions asked during the focus group
testing).
Once we completed our “auto-coding” and ran the “word query,” we
continued to manually analyze our transcripts, despite the fact that the
initial words derived from the queries were instrumental in generating
models demonstrating relationships and patterns that we ought to be
looking for or expect to find in our respective transcripts.

Results and Discussion
The focus group testing was an invaluable exercise in understanding how
certain members of the Somali-American community in San Diego, CA,
interpret and respond to terrorist violence, specifically as discussed
through the lens of ICSVE-produced counter-narratives. Despite being an
all-male sample, a majority of the respondents reported negative
emotional responses to what they heard from the ISIS defector, especially
as they discussed about the rape of Syrian women. When participants in
Focus Group 2 were asked about their views on using Yazidi women, or
any other women for that matter, as sex slaves, all respondents used
adjectives such as disturbing, shocking, depressing, etc. to describe them.
The Chart 1 below depicts Focus Group 2 participant aggregate views and
feelings when discussing “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu Bakr alBaghdadi” video and the use of women as sex slaves, with a majority of
them using adjectives such as angered (13%), heartbreaking (22%), etc.
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Chart 1: Opinions About “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi” and Use of Yazidi Women as Sex Slaves
Disturbing

Angry

Depressing

Hearbreaking

13%

Disgusting

Shocking

Ashamed

13%

4%
4%
22%
13%

13%

18%

Source: Author

Also consider the following Focus Group 1 participants’ emotional
responses to the question of “What do you think about the defector (Abu
Ghazwan) saying he suffers post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),” when
viewing “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State’ counternarrative video”
(The Chart 2 below contains the frequency of adjectives used to describe
their views and feelings):
• “I think that anyone would feel the same way.”
•

“If you experience things like this, it’s going to have an effect on
you. It’s part of human nature to deal with nightmares after
something traumatic.”
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Chart 2: Abu Ghazwan (Video) Suffering Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD)
Crazy

Depressing

Heartbreaking

Horrible

Intense

8%

No pity

Saddening

Tragic

Unsettling

7%

8%

7%

8%

23%

23%

8%
8%

Source: Author

The findings run contrary to the assumption that men are less likely to
show discomfort, fear, or disgust—or are in “total control of their
emotions”—when interacting with violent content or narratives.78 That
said, it would be wrong to assume that they are expressing such
sentiments “as much as women” might, as the sample did not include any
women. Moreover, as shown above, participants discussed the issue of
PTSD through accumulation of hardships, arguably rooted in the
experience of war, which they themselves can relate to through either
personal or collective memory of the war back in their homeland
(Somalia). Equally important and strictly speaking in the context of
participant responses with respect to rape, some Somali Americans may be
vulnerable to being manipulated emotionally about rape, as past al
Shabaab recruitment tactics manipulated Somalis to return to their
homeland (Somali) to fight jihad to prevent the rape of Somali women. In
this regard, the defense of women’s honor, or a belief system among many
Arabs and Muslims that valorizes women’s honor, was clearly reflected in
participant responses.

Focus Group 1 Survey Data
(Frequency of words used to express emotions, feelings, etc. by the
participants concerning “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State” video. For
example, unbelievable (12%), tragic (9%), terrible (6%), and wrong (6%)
were the most frequently selected descriptors). See Chart 3 for a
breakdown.
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Chart 3: Opinions About “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State”
Video

Unsettling
6%

Wrong
6%

Crazy Difficult to watch
3%
3%
Disturbing
6%
Depressing
3%

Unbelievable
12%

Effective
3%

Eye-opening
9%

Tragic
9%

Hearbreaking
6%
Horrible
3%
Impactful
3%

Terrible
6%
Surreal
3% Scary
3%

Sad
6%

Informative
6%
Intense
Real
3%
3%

Source: Author

Four of the five respondents who chose to identify themselves in the
survey and during discussion thought the video was credible and that the
main protagonist (Abu Ghazwan) featured in “Rewards for Joining the
Islamic State” was telling the truth when discussing his experiences inside
the ISIS. In viewing “A Sex Slave for You—a Gift from Abu Bakr alBaghdadi,” four out of five participants believed the speaker was credible
(See Table 3). Four of the participants noted:
• “Yes, I think it’s true; no one would make up things like this.”
•

“His tone changes when he talked about his mother, so I think it’s
real based on his emotions I can hear.”

•

“You just can’t make things up like this. Even when he talked about
the religion, he used the right terminology, like “Allah Azzawajal.”

•

Four out of five also believed the speaker was telling the truth (See
table that follows), with some remaining reserved in their views.
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•

“Only God knows.”

•

“Hard to tell but at the same time it’s realistic.”

•

“We couldn’t see his face, so in many ways I have some doubt about
how real it is.”

•

“One thing for sure is that the mothers in the video where not real.”

•

“The clips were real and geographic region can attest to that. Only
someone from the region would know if it’s real or not.”

Some participants, however, questioned the speaker and video’s
authenticity, asking if they were produced by Hollywood or some
government-affiliated entity. They also stated that videos would look more
authentic if the defector faces were actually shown:
•

“Yes, look at some of the T.V. shows that are out there regarding
terrorism they all look real, but it’s made it Hollywood.”

•

“I think it would be more real if he showed his face, and maybe kept
it real and just say he did some raping himself.”

Indeed, we already have evidence suggesting that in the case of countermessages that bear the seal of a government entity (for example, U.S. State
Department), the effectiveness of such counter-messaging may be
rendered partially, or entirely, ineffective due to such symbolic
association. However, ICSVE researchers aimed to avoid this by openly
disclosing in its branding the authorship of the video (for example, using
the ICSVE seal on the video and clearly attributing authorship to the
nonprofit). However, it was interesting to see that some participants still
doubted the production authenticity of the video. The suggestion to show
the faces of the defectors is an important but difficult, if not impossible,
request to achieve due to the interviewee’s own security concerns. On a
positive note, despite some doubts on the authenticity of the speaker due
to their faces being hidden from the camera, a majority of the participants
expressed confidence in the authenticity of the ISIS defectors presented in
the counter-narrative, and even those that had doubts strongly engaged
with the material presented in it. Thus, despite any doubts, everyone
engaged with the material that the videos elicited from the group. Even the
doubters participated in the discussions, suggesting that they may have
taken the speaker seriously after voicing potential doubts about his
authenticity and having the chance to have their questions answered by
the discussion group leader.
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Focus Group 2 Survey Data
The Table 3 below contains Focus Group 2 participant agreement, as
measured on a 1-7 scale, on a set of questions pertaining to “Rewards for
Joining the Islamic State” video.
Table 3. Participant Agreement on “Rewards for Joining the
Islamic State” Video
NA
Video could convince someone joining ISIS
not to join ISIS79
The video affects me how I feel about ISIS
The speaker (Abu Ghazwan) was wrong to
place bombs in cars and homes
The speaker (Abu Ghazwan) was wrong to
join ISIS
The Speaker (Abu Ghazwan) is real ISIS
Source: Author

1

Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement)
2
3
4
5
6

1

1

3

3

1
1

1
4
4
1

4

The results of the survey, as shown in the Table 4 and Table 5, indicate an
unfavorable view of ISIS.80 For example, when looking at the tables, all
participants in Focus Group 1 believe that ISIS is a terrorist organization
and that ISIS does not adhere to Quran and Islamic principles. Moreover,
all of the participants in both focus groups during discussions expressed
that violence perpetrated by ISIS, namely suicide bombings and violence
against civilians and other religious and ethnic groups, is never justified. A
small share of the participants, however, expressed frustration over
politics and the government of Iraq, including U.S. foreign influence in the
Middle East. Consider the following statements made by some participants
when addressing a narrative presented by Abu Ghazwan in the “Rewards
for joining the Islamic State” counter-narrative as well as how some
participants echoed the sectarian issues that in part drove Abu Ghazwan to
join ISIS:
•

“They left the Shia friends go. That’s how their government
works. If you are a Shia, you’re off the hook. And if you are a
Sunni or something else, you are going to die in prison.”

•

“He was mad at the government, so we need to look at the
government and the people who are not just; they are the ones
causing the problem.”

•

“To some degree I think it was the leadership and government
as well [responsible], who are not just to certain groups that
cause this problem.”
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•

“Well we know our government is responsible for all the
troubles in almost every country. We can use violence, but we
need to address the root of the problem.”

•

“Hell, no, they never did that, that how you lose your license bro
you can’t say terrorism and Jewish or Christians in the same
sentence.”

Focus Group 1 Survey Data
The Table 4 below contains Focus Group One participant opinions, as
measured on a 1-7 scale, about ISIS.
Table 4. Focus Group 1 Participant Opinions about ISIS
Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement)

Someone who kills/dies for ISIS is a martyr
ISIS is wrong to kill innocent civilians
ISIS is engaged in violence
I identify with ISIS’ version of Islam
ISIS is practicing real Islam
ISIS is following the real Quran
ISIS is a terrorist organization
Source: Author

1
4

2
1

3

4

5

6

7

5
5
5
5
5
5

Focus Group 2 Survey Data
The Table 5 below contains Focus Group Two participant opinions, as
measured on a 1-7 scale, about ISIS.
Table 5. Focus Group 2 Participant Opinions about ISIS
Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement)
NA
ISIS is engaged in violence
ISIS is a terrorist organization
ISIS is following the real Quran
ISIS is practicing real Islam
I identify with ISIS’ version of
Islam
I disagree with their methods
(for example, beheadings) but
support their objectives
ISIS is fighting for Muslim rights
Source: Author

1

2

3

4

5

6

1
3

4
4

5
5
5
5
4

1
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Although opinions on the issue remain mixed, similar to our focus groups
findings in Zarqa and Irbid in Jordan, sectarian and religious favoritism,
lack of government responsiveness, and corruption are often blamed for a
range of ills, including the rise of ISIS, though these conditions are not
entirely unrealistic.81The issue here is whether participants believe that
groups like ISIS can help to address the contentious social, economic,
political, etc. issues or if they should be avoided entirely as offering any
real and practical solutions to such issues. Exploring and understanding
such sentiments is crucial given that ISIS’ existence and durability lies in
its ability to apply its ideology and tactics to the grievances of Sunni
Muslims around the world. It is how it manages to garner support for its
cause. As also evidenced in our research in other parts of the world, the
appeal and attractiveness of ISIS’ non-violent, slickly produced video
material and propaganda—those that feature some of the themes
described by our participants, namely the themes of brotherhood,
victimization, community, religious prosecution, etc.—among those who
do not profess or sympathize with the group remains especially
worrisome.
One of the key objectives of the focus group testing was to highlight ISIS’
hypocrisy in claiming to be representing the Muslim cause or creating a
Caliphate run by Muslim ideals in the territory of Iraq and Syria. All
respondents, in both focus groups, understood the intended message of
our counternarratives. Likewise, they expressed gratitude for having been
invited into a safe space where they could openly debate some of the issues
groups like ISIS raise. Although a small and non-representative sample,
there are several implications associated with such findings. Firstly, it
speaks to the quality of the video in terms of both production and the
manner in which the anti-ISIS message was delivered. Secondly, contrary
to some assumptions, counternarratives that contain violent footage taken
from ISIS do not necessarily serve to encourage or glorify the ISIS cause or
attacks, and may, as we were able to observe, open discussions where
horror, disgust, and anger over ISIS tactics dominates. Chiefly, such
findings lend little credibility to claims made by some that any use of
material produced by ISIS may serve “as a direct or indirect
encouragement for the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of
terrorism.”82 No participant raised concern over such an issue. Instead,
the emotionally evocative material that serves ISIS in their recruiting tasks
also served us in our ability to open a lively discussion. It is in part through
such evocative material that participants thought about and discussed
extremely disturbing socio-political issues—to which ISIS claims to have
answers—albeit violent answers.
Lastly, ISIS-produced videos and content greatly outnumber counternarratives produced by governments and other entities such as ours. Given
the high-volume production of ISIS material in relation to countermessages produced by governments and other entities, individuals in the
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West often have no idea about, or misunderstand the purpose and use of
counter narratives. For example, as mentioned above, counter-narratives
may to a degree serve to mimic ISIS materials but do not in any way glorify
ISIS. This misunderstanding is sometimes evidenced among counter
terrorism experts who view our or similar videos, clearly not reflected in
participant responses. Examples such as these indicate that we need to
continue to engage in sustained coverage of counter-narratives such as
ours.
Focus Group 1 Survey Data
As stated earlier in the article, it is highly likely that most, if not all,
participants in the focus groups already had biased or unfavorable views
towards ISIS. In fact, when we asked Focus Group 1 “If the
counternarratives could convince somebody considering joining ISIS not
to,” two out five doubted the utility of the counter-narrative, primarily
because they already held unfavorable views towards ISIS. In this regard,
several of the respondents noted:
•

“Not really. I never thought ISIS had any good in them.”

•

“They are evil.”

•

“I don’t think about them at all.”

The aforementioned may lead some to question the effectiveness of
counter-narratives. That said, while some of the participants were
reassuring the fellow group members that they were not vulnerable to
recruitment, they also strongly engaged with the material. This may also
suggest that ISIS could also engage them. In other words, although some
participants claimed that ISIS could never influence them, we were able to
observe strong emotional responses to the ISIS material. This suggests
that it is emotionally charged material and important to the participants.
However, in our case, it was presented in a way that discredited ISIS or
any violent extremist group as having credible answers. This was the main
point of the exercise.
There is a caveat in making such assumptions, however. First, most of the
focus group participants reported having negative attitudes and opinions
about ISIS. This cannot be dismissed in determining their potential for
recruitment. However, we must also keep in mind that reporting
unfavorable opinions about ISIS is the expected response in today’s
security environment for minority Muslims, first and second-generation
immigrants. Moreover, most would be hesitant to openly admit in a first
encounter that they harbor positive sentiments about ISIS out of fear that
the researchers are informants or that they could somehow be harmed by
speaking candidly about it.
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Secondly, just because our focus group participants engaged with our
counter-narratives, it does not necessarily mean that they would engage
with material that ISIS would show them. Namely, there are a number of
predictors that determine how audiences interact with the material. While
such contentions may hold true, based on our interactions with SomaliAmerican population, we also know that many do engage with ISIS
material and endorse parts of their ideology, which makes them vulnerable
to further ideological indoctrination and recruitment.
One should highlight the utility of openly pointing out lies inherent in
terrorist propaganda and correcting any doubts and misinformation that
might be circulating in the participants’ everyday lives. One must also
stress the utility of creating a safe space in which a vulnerable audience
can even discuss ISIS’ claims. The voices of defectors, including the voices
of ISIS victims, are especially powerful if shown in safe environments,
where a guided discussion can take place. Arguably, building wellinformed and resilient communities is essential to countering violent
extremist appeal.
One of the goals of the counter narrative videos is to present a learning
opportunity to youth in which they can learn not through their own
negative experiences but vicariously as well, namely from others who
faced similar choices and made serious mistakes in joining ISIS [long]
before them. When resonating and evoking strong responses, it enables
the viewers to imagine themselves accepting the ISIS claims and ending up
in the bad circumstances that are being narrated to them in the video.
While they may strongly identify with the extremist rhetoric, mainly
rooted in victimization narrative, it gives them a chance, without having to
commit a mistake themselves, to learn that trying to solve the victimhood
dilemma through solutions offered by ISIS is unlikely to end well.
Counternarratives such as ours also explore feelings, and not just words.
This is the reason why they are highly likely to influence vulnerable
individuals to learn from other people’s negative experiences and
mistakes. Should they be confronted with and lured into ISIS “remedies”
at some point in their lives, the counter-narratives also serve to offer
additional tools to the participants to potentially address and advise other
vulnerable individuals.
The ISIS cadres interviewed in the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter
Narrative Project, including the ones shown to the focus group
participants, often share and discuss their own psychological needs and
sufferings. They attempt to make sense of their experiences leading to and
inside of ISIS and what it means now to not only themselves (for example,
spending prison time, having traumatic experiences, etc.) but to others as
well (for example, pain, suffering, etc. they may have caused to others). By
viewing such material, the focus group participants engaged in an
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interactive learning process, whereby the process itself facilitated a
narrative exchange. It is through such processes that focus group
participants not only discussed personal experiences but may also have
possibly facilitated impactful disengagement and radicalization processes
involving others. One respondent shared a personal experience related to
the rape of a relative sparked after watching “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift
from Abu Bakr al Baghdadi” video. The personal story of the participant
added a degree of relatedness to the defector story, including authenticity
to the story told by him. The respondent comments and reactions by other
discussants are captured below:
•

“Yeah bro why not, how the [expletive] are they being held captive
[Yazidi sex slaves] and caught in the first place. It’s [expletive] other
man who let that happen. So, since they are being raped now, that
means next time protecting your [expletive] women. I would die
before telling that [expletive] happen.”

•

“Yo calm down with that [expletive] man! I have a family member
who was raped and beaten to death and it has nothing to do with
not being able to protect them.”

•

“I’m sorry to hear that bro. I don’t mean it’s right for it to happen.
But I’m sorry to hear that. Very emotional (10-minute break)
participant in tears! Do you want to talk about how you feel?”

•

“No, I’m okay. Just want to say that you can lose someone you love
and close to you by rape and force. It has nothing to do with ISIS or
politics, or Sunni and Shia. If I was there I would do anything to
change the outcome I would give my life bro! But Allah didn’t place
us there to stop it or have the ability to even know about it. He
knows what’s best.”

Arguably, throughout both focus groups, the videos—even if some at first
doubted their authenticity—were able to reach vulnerable youth and open
them up to in-depth discussions of the topics that ISIS tries to use to
ensnare them on the Internet. All the participants shared their unfavorable
view of ISIS. Some were either already against ISIS before engaging with
the materials or clearly became so when confronted with the troubling
experiences of the ISIS cadres denouncing the claims ISIS had made to
them and the clear reality that joining had not in any way enhanced their
lives.

Limitations
Several important limitations apply to the focus group findings. It seems
likely that most, if not all, participants who took part in the focus group
testing already had unfavorable views towards ISIS in general. However, it
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is also likely that subjects may have particular beliefs and views that align
with ISIS’ claims. This can make them open to manipulation and more
favorable towards ISIS. Our goal was the opposite in this regard: To
challenge anything where they might believe ISIS was in the right.
Likewise, given the security environment in which Somali American youth
feel suspicious of CVE efforts, the sample participants might have been
hesitant to truthfully share their sentiments about ISIS and its ideology. In
fact, some admitted to the focus group moderator that there are no forums
where they can speak openly and safely about these issues without
suspecting that, others might be informants or that their views will be
misconstrued in some way, shape. This leaves them vulnerable to not fully
developing their resistance and resilience to terrorist group recruitment.
It is likely that in any such sample there may be some who fall on a
spectrum: Those who are truly radicalized and already supportive of ISIS
and its ideology, but unlikely to openly admit it; those who are at risk of
radicalization; those who hold unfavorable views about ISIS; and those
who are simply neutral about ISIS. Moreover, the focus group served to
test the utility of counternarratives in supporting negative attitudes
towards ISIS or increasing negative existing attitudes towards ISIS as well
as challenging any views that might support ISIS, but it did not measure
the possibility of interesting focus group participants further in ISIS and
its ideology.83 It also did not utilize control and comparison groups, which
could be done in the future. This would entail experimental designs (for
example, the treatment, and the control groups with random assignment)
or quasi-experimental designs (post-test only, time-series design etc.).84
Lastly, while many participants might have already had unfavorable views
towards ISIS and might not favor or succumb to extremist narratives, the
focus group testing served as an opportunity for the participants to access
and learn about educational resources that openly target violent extremist
groups like ISIS. Similarly, as researchers, we gained additional knowledge
on the most appealing and resonating aspects of the video. The group
discussions also presented an opportunity for the participants to talk
about difficult topics and debate claims made by ISIS. Participants would
have generally avoided discussing them if they judged the environment not
to be safe. The participants were also offered information that they can use
the videos to target and educate others who might be vulnerable to such
extremist narratives, namely serve as influencers to magnify the impact of
the counternarratives.

Conclusion
This article highlighted the results of the ICSVE counter-narrative focus
group testing administered with a small sample of Somali youth in San
Diego, California. It also presented methodological argument, or a case
study, in the use of counter narratives as an effective Counter Violent
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Extremism (CVE) tool.85 The small sample sizes do not allow us to
generalize the findings. However, the research is important in measuring
attitudes towards violent extremist groups like ISIS, which remains largely
under-researched in the context of Somali-American community in the
United States. The goal was to offer and test for the Somali-American
community in San Diego tools to fight the appeal of violent extremist
groups in their respective communities. Our research shows that when
administered in a focus group setting with a trusted Somali focus group
moderator, such tools can be highly effective in generating invaluable
discussions around issue related to ISIS recruitment and ISIS-related
radicalization.
This research is considered a “community-based participatory research,”
namely the one in which Somali-Americans served as core members of our
research team and ensured that our research design and objectives were
closely aligned with those of the participant community. We also
attempted to ensure that the participants had a strong stake in
understanding and preventing violent extremism in their respective
communities. In addition, by engaging in community-based participatory
research, we strove to ensure that the participants do not feel as though
they are being unfairly targeted or stigmatized in relation to our research
objectives.86 In that regard, we also judged the effort a success as
participants expressed gratitude for being invited to participate as well as
given the opportunity of a safe environment in which to discuss difficult
topics related to ISIS and violent extremism in general. It is our view that
without the emotionally evocative nature of the videos such discussions
may have fallen flat, but given the videos, lively discussions took place.
The findings do not suggest that we certainly reached a pool of “at-risk”
individuals for radicalization, including radicalization leading to violence,
as we have in our previous studies.87 Such findings, however, should not
prevent us from concluding that though at times with narrow limits and
applications, counter-narratives remain one among many important tools
in countering the appeal of violent extremism. While we realize this is just
one tool among many, we, in fact, acknowledge that assuming primacy of
any CVE tool would be detrimental to the CVE objectives we are trying to
address, both in terms of response and prevention efforts. However, given
the scale of participant engagement in focus group discussions, we were
able to indeed touch on the same issues that ISIS attempts to manipulate
in its recruitment efforts. Arguably, if not already turned off, the
participants in our discussions were even further turned away from ISIS
and bolstered by the counter-narratives and ensuing discussions in those
negative views of ISIS. Thus, we feel confident that these tools can be used
if carried out in a safe and careful way to effectively fight and disrupt ISIS
recruitment. They can be used for both interventions and prevention of
ISIS-related radicalization in the Somali American community.
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Our focus group testing with the Somali-American community members
was carried out in conjunction with several other research studies
conducted by our center worldwide. In all instances, in our experience, the
emotional and conversational nature of targeted prevention is best carried
through face-to-face interactions and through interpersonal activity, in
which counter-narratives play a crucial role in facilitating such
engagement and interpersonal activity.88 However, given the widespread
use of Internet learning, we also acknowledge that such materials can also
be instrumental online, although lacking the personal care and touch that
a discussion moderator can offer. Given that ISIS was able to leverage
social media feedback mechanisms to contact those who respond to their
online material, the same should be possible for those wishing to use the
counter-narrative videos in a similar manner—contacting those who
respond to them for further online discussions, possibly leading to offline
meetings. Future research will focus on more targeted efforts, and ideally
with other vulnerable and “at-risk” individuals for radicalization, including
radicalization leading to violence. Our efforts with respect to the members
of American-Somali community focused on small wins over the long haul
against ISIS and other similar extremist groups.
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Appendix A

Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter-Narrative Project
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
researchers, alongside its European branch staff members in Brussels,
Belgium, has been interviewing ISIS defectors, returnees, and prisoners
over the last three years—most interviews captured on video with a sample
of 94 interviews having been collected worldwide to date. ICSVE
researchers have also interviewed 16 al-Shabaab members and their family
members. The resulting video interviews are edited down to their most
damning content to discredit ISIS (and organizations like ISIS) and
delegitimize them as corrupt, un-Islamic, and brutal. The video clips
feature ISIS insiders denouncing the group as well as make use of actual
ISIS propaganda film (reframed with disgust and turned back against
itself) to illustrate the speaker’s words. These counter narrative videos
depict mostly young men and women who were drawn into ISIS out of
hopes for a better life, a desire to live an Islamic way of life, and to build
the Islamic Caliphate. They were drawn out of vulnerabilities that often
match those in the Somali American community. The ICSVE-produced
narratives feature how the speaker was drawn into the group, what he/she
at first believed and liked, and how he/she was deeply disappointed over
time. The speakers discuss and share the experiences that turned them
away from ISIS and the price they paid, in many cases, for joining. They
also advise others not to join.
The video clips are subtitled in the over 21 languages in which ISIS recruits
(Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian, Finnish, French, German,
Italian, Russian, Somali, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and UzbekMany of
these languages are relevant to migrant and immigrant descent Muslim
youth, as well as ordinary citizens that ISIS and organizations like ISIS are
reaching inside the United States and elsewhere. Our experience with
Somali American youth, however, is that they would generally interact
with our English subtitled videos.
The videos are currently being used on five continents by law enforcement,
intelligence officers, counselors, teachers, prison workers and other P/CVE
professionals. The following represents applications of our counternarrative videos. It also spells out several key indicators that serve as both
direct and indirect measure of our success in terms of detection, early
intervention, and prevention using these counter narratives:
•

•

A thirteen-year-old boy from London, UK, hell-bent on going to
Raqqa, Syria, turned back by viewing one of the ICSVE-produced
videos. The account was documented and reported by a UK Prevent
counselor who worked closely with the boy.
An ISIS emir (ISIS superior) interviewed in Iraq by ICSVE
researchers hanging his head in shame after viewing two of the
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•

•

•

•

•

ICSVE-produced counternarratives, and admitting, “We were
wrong. We argued over some of these in the group [as presented in
our counternarratives]. We gave a bad face to Islam.”
Multiple focus groups of the ICSVE counter-narratives in the
United States, Central Asia, the Middle East (With vulnerable youth
in hotbeds of radicalization, such as Zarqa, Irbid, and Salt in
Jordan), and the Balkans, leading to open and lively discussions, as
well as better understandings on how youth view ISIS and what
their vulnerabilities are in potentially being recruited into the
group. The focus groups also served to understand what resonates
most with ISIS supporters and sympathizers in terms of our content
and how the emotionally evocative nature of the videos helped open
up countering violent extremism discussions that might otherwise
be hard to hold, as the participants might be reticent to share their
experiences and concerns. This helped to solidify our belief in the
effectiveness of our counter-narrative videos.
Prison and CVE officials in Central Asia agreeing that most effective
narratives against violent extremist group recruitment come from
convicted terrorists who engage with fellow prisoners in ideological
and religious debates and from ISIS defectors and returnees from
the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria who can communicate about the
dangers of joining violent extremist groups. Our videos are
currently being used by law enforcement officials in Kyrgyzstan
(hosted on their official website) to fight and raise awareness about
the appeal of violent extremism in the country. Through use of
counter-narratives such as ours, they also hope to use them in
prison prevention and deradicalization efforts, including in the case
of those who have served prison time and are now on probation.
Training law enforcement, intelligence officers, and other CVE
professionals around the world on their use and applications.
Working closely with teachers as well. The U.S. Embassy in
Copenhagen is making them available in Danish subtitles. The
counter narratives are also accompanied with study guides in
Danish for teachers to use as a prevention and intervention tools in
their respective classrooms.
Sending out our counter-narratives on Facebook and Telegram in
attempts to reach and influence ISIS supporters and sympathizers
online. ICSVE researchers successfully identified 50 English and 77
Albanian speaking Facebook profiles that were coded as highly
radicalized based on their endorsements of ISIS materials and
association with ISIS-related networks online. These accounts were
successfully tagged with ICSVE videos in attempts to generate
increased cognitive dissonance and discussions against ISIS.
Conducting over 60 awareness campaigns over Facebook, resulting
in over 1.7 million views in Iraq alone. Considerable discussion was
generated in these campaigns as well. Such discussions serve as a
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•

•

testament to the ability of the ICSVE counter narrative videos to
evoke thought-provoking engagement.
Increasing interaction over YouTube with the ICSVE counter
narrative videos, including many claims that ISIS is still strong and
powerful. This indicates that our videos are reaching the correct
audiences. The ICSVE team has recently built a new website
(www.theRealJihad.org) to not only measure the efficacy of its
interventions online (for example, tracing conversions, leads, etc.)
but also redirect those landing on its website to more tolerant
interpretations of Islam and referrals for psychological and other
support to walk away from terrorism. We hope that the website will
also lead the viewer into a deeper engagement with our counter
narrative materials. The English version of the website already has
over 90,000 viewers.
The ICSVE team is also continuing to follow up on the training
provided to law enforcement, intelligence, and other CVE
practitioners worldwide to generate an assessment on the extent to
which such trainings have better equipped these professionals in
their fight against violent extremism.
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